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Each individual in society has an important interest in 
protecting the privacy of his person and possessions from 
i n te r ference . Society as a whole also has an interest in 
preserving Lhc righl Lo privacy ol jLs individual citizens. 
Opposed to this privacy interest is the law enforcement 
in l eresl . The la\.; enlorn'lllL'lll i11LL·n·:,L is Lile lnlcn.:til oL 
t h e state in the apprehension and sanctioning of offenders 
against the crimi nal law as a means of protecting its 
individual citizens from criminal activily . An individual 
may r ecognise the importance of the law enforement interest 
by cu ll Sl' ll l I ng Lu a :;v:1 rc li hy I ill' po Ii l'l', Lli • a1 1,(·11cy wli I ell 
the state has created to carry out its function of enforcing 
the criminal law, of his person and possessions . In 
ci r cumstances where an individual expressly consents to a 
search his interests and the interests of the state are not 
in conflict . The individual can revoke his consent to the 
search at any time and is therefore, in theory at least, in 
control of the extent to which his privacy is to be inter-
fered with. 
In circumstances where an individual will not consent to a 
search by the poliffiltowever, the interest of privacy and of 
law enforcement come into direct conflict. The law governing 
the po l ice power to search the person and possessions o[ 
indivi duals in society is an attempt to balance these competing 
interests . The law creates two major powers of search which 
are available to police officers in New Zealand. They are 
search pursuant to warrant and search incidental to arrest. 
The poli~power to search pursuant to warrant is created by 
statute. Section 198 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 
gives the poli~wide powers to obtain search warrants. A police 
officer must apply to a judicial officer for a search warrant. 
The judicial officer may then issue a search warrant if he is 
salisficd Lii,tl Llil'rl' i:; a n·c1:;011al>ll' i;n11111d !or hL'liL'ving Lhal 
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there exists in any place anything on or in respect of which 
an offence has been conunitted, or any evidence as to the 
conunission of an offence, or anything believed to be intended 
to be usc<l Ln Lht• commisfdon of an ofll'nce, if LI!(• offence 
is punishable by imprisonment. A search warrant must list 
:lpl'Cllll' ulil'lll'l':1 \vlill'ii ll n·l:ili·i; lo, ll 11111 :;I 11:,l r;pvcllll' 
places to which the power of search extends, and it must 
state what is being searched for eiLher specifically or in a 
more general class of things. An important provision of 
section 198 of the Act is that every police officer executing 
is required to do so. The requirements of a search warrant 
issued under section 198 of the Act provide three important 
checks on the police power to search pursuant to warrant. The 
power to search is restricted to specific places, for a 
specific type of thing, for a specific offence and within a 
specified time. An independent judicial officer has the 
discretion to refuse to issue a search warrant if in his 
opinion reasonable grounds do not exist for a search. The 
person being searched is given a warning as to the extent 
that his privacy is to be invaded. Therefore section 198 of 
the Act has the effect of creating a power of search which 
assists the police in the enforl'emcnt of the criminal law 
but through careful drafting contains built in checks which 
ensure that an individual who is being searched pursuant to 
a warrant is safeguarded against arbitrary and excessive us e s 
of the power . Thus the police power to search pursuant to 
warrant in New Zealand reprcsenLs a compro•nise between the 
interest in individual privacy and the interest in efficient 
law enforcement . 1 
The power of search pursuant to warrant provided by section 198 
of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 was first enacted in section 
341 of the Criminal Code Act 1893. That Act was substantially 
an Hdoplllltl ol Lill' Mnd,·l C:rl111!11al C:lllit- lu1·11111lall'd l>y 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 1860. The Model Criminal Code 
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was an attempt at codification of the criminal law as it 
existed in the cases at that time . The police power of 
search incidental to arrest is, unlike the power of search 
purst1:1nl Lo wa1-r:111l, ;t cn·:tlt1n· or Ll1(· c<>111111011 law. I Ls 
genesis was in two civil cases, 2 both of which were decided 
in 1853. Because Ll1c police po1.;cr o[ search incidental to 
arrest was established in civil cases and had not long been 
recognised by the judiciary at the time that the Model 
Criminal Code was formulated, the power was not codified in 
the original Model Criminal Code and therefore was not 
:n1hs,'qu,·11L I y ndopl l'd i 11 N1•1.; 1/.1·.1 I .111\I I t·1·.J 1; I .tl I 011. '1'11 In In 
surprising in view of the importance of the interests that 
must be balanced in the creation of any police power of search. 
A New Zealand writer has noted that this omission is parti-
cularly surprising in view of the great care with which other 
branches of criminal law and practice have been legislated 
3 by Parliament in New Zealand. 
It is possible to justify the existence of a police power of 
search incidental to arrest in four separate situations. The 
first situation in which a police power of search incidental 
to arrest might be justified is where a police officer searched 
an arrested person to ensure that the arrested person has no 
means of injuring himself or others while in custody. The 
justification for the power of search in this ~ituation was 
stated by Williams Jin the case of Leigh v. Colc: 4 
"It is clear that the police ought to be 
fully protected in the discharge of an onerous, 
arduos, and difficult duty - a duty necessary 
for the comfort and security of the community" 
The interest that might justify a power of search in this 
situation is then the interest of police officers, and by 
injury that an arrested person might cause them . 
I . .. 
" 
• 
" 0 ~ 
" -
(4) 
The second situation in which a police power to search an 
arresLcd person mighl be jusLificcl is \vlwre :t police officer 
searches an arrested person in ord(•r to ohtain evidence of 
t I I (. () I I (. 11 l'' . w i l I I w I I i ( I I t I I I t I " . I : ol >I I i : : ( I I. I I ; ','. d . TI I<' J 11:; t i I i ( .. I I I () 11 
for LlH' pnw,'r nf Sl':trch in lhis •;it11.1lion is slnl<·d by P:1llC's C.B. 
i1 1 IHI lu11 v . 0 1 !\1 L1·11.' J11 IJ1,1[ l,I!,< I[ \-J.J!, i!l'Jd IJ1.tl lill'll' 
was a right to detain property in the possession o[ Lhe person 
arn'stccl. Tlie lcarnl'd judgl' sl.tlcd Lktl Lliis right was based 
on the principle Ll1at: 
() 
"1\1,· i11l,·1,·::I 111 l\w ::1.11,· 111 tJ1,• fll'l',1111 1·\1.ll)',1',I 
being brought lo Lrial in due course necessarily 
extends as \vcll to L11c preservation of material 
evidence of his guilt or innocence as to his 
custody for the purpose of trial. llis 
custody is of no value i[ Lhe law is powerless 
to prevenl the abstraction or destruction of this 
evidence, \vilhout which a trial \-JOllld be no more 
than an emply form" 
The third situation in \vhich a po\jcc• pmver to SC'arch an 
arresLed person might be justified is ~,ere a police officer 
offence . In Elias v. I Pasmore Horridge J exlended the princiPl<· 
on which Dillon v. O'Brien 1vas decidcJ Lo justify the power of 
search in this situation also:
0 
"It therefore' seems Lo me that the intL'.rcsls oi 
the State must excuse the seizure of documents, which 
seizure would ot:henvise be unlawful., it if apµears 
in fact that such docu·ncnts were evidence of a 
crime committed by anyone . " 
The final situation in \vhich a polict· Lo Sl':trcli an :1rrcst('d 
pc1::1111 111ii·.i1l ill' 111:,l i I 1,·,I 1:. 1,11, 1,· ,1 l'"I i,,. ul I it,·J :;1.11tl!l':; :t11 
arrcsLed person in ordL'r t:o H'lllOVL' his valuables. The justification 
I .. . 
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For this powe r of sea r ch i s that if the po l ice do no t have 
th e power to remove a n arrested persons property the n it may 
b e t ake n from him o r damaged in t h e time that he is i n 
c u slotly . T il ls wou l d of co1 11·st• i>l' dt·LrimL·nLa l Lo l h l• inlcresls 
of th e a rrested person. Such s i tuation would also be 
L!L-L1· l111L' I\L ;1l LO Lil l' [ 11 il' t·,·:;[!i ol l l ll' po l ll'(' ,l!I l l l<'y wou l d l>v 
open to a llegat ions of misco nduct . 
A pol i ce powe r of search inc i dental to arn·sL might Lhen be 
justi f i ed in th ese fo u r situations in order t o protect t h e 
s pC'cifiL: inl t'rL's l s i n volv<·d i11 l :1w <'111·orcl'rnl'11l which h:1vc' 
been ide n t i f i e d sepa r ately in each s i tuation . Standing in 
op position t o th ese law enforcement inte r ests however , is the 
privacy inte r e s t as exp r essed by Williams J i n the case of 
Le i gh v . Cole:9 
"i t i s ... i ncumbent on everyone engaged in the 
administ r ation of justice , to take care that 
th e powers necessarily en t rusted to the pol i ce 
a r e n ot made an i nstrument of oppression or of 
t y r a nny towards even the meanest, most depraved 
a nd b ases t subjects of the realm." 
The police power of search incidental Lo arrest should represe nt 
a ba l a n ce between these important competing interests of on 
th e one h a nd th e pr i vacy of the individual, and the interest of 
soc i e t y as a wh ole in maintaining the p r ivacy interc>sts of its 
indiv i d ua l cit izens , and on the other hand the interests of the 
state and i nd i vidual citizens in the collection of evidence in 
r e l a ti on t o offences committed by an arrested person , the 
prot e c t i o n of the pol i ce and othe r s from the arrested person , 
a nd t he pro t ection of t he arrested persons property . Before it i s 
po ss ibl e to cons i der the balance that the common law has i n fact 
achi e v e d b e t wee n t hese i n t e r ests it i s necessary to de t e r mine 
pn'c i :;L• l y Lil e li1nils or Lltl' pu l Lcl' pov.;< ! r Lo sv.irc li incJcJe n Lal Lo 
a rre st (h e r e inaf t e r referred to as " t h e common law power " ) . 
I ... 
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The genera l question of who.t.: arc the 1 imits of the common 
law po1vcr c.1me be,orc Lhc St1pn'mc Courl ol ~,e\-1 1/.caland in 
the case of Rudling v . Police . 10 The rnate:rial facls of 
Lli:1l c.,~;c· \v< · t·<· . 1:; i<>I 101,1:; . 
home on a charge of misuse of Lhc Lclcphonc under section 
Ill.',(:')(,·) \II flt,· l'\1::1 i)lftc·,· ,\, I i'l ','J I I \v. 1 : : • 1 I I , ·) ·., · <I 
that Rudling bad used abusive and insulling language Lo Lhe 
police over the telephone in the l'J.rly hours of Lhe morning. 
lie w:is Lnkcn Lo Lhc Cc11L1··1I l'ol icv Sl.1Lion i>y ConsL.1hlc• l\nl\·lll. 
The evidence showed that al the Li,11e Rudling was abusive, 
.1 1·)·.11111!'111 .11 iv,·, 11:: itl)'. ,111:;,·,·11,· l.111:·.11.1:·.,· .11111 i'.,·11,·1.111 y 111 :.11 I I ill) '. 
Ll1e police. ll12 1,1as uliecLcJ by liquor. Tile conslablc in 
charge of the watch-house, Constable Glazebrook, asked 
Conslablc Brown to search Rudling . Wien ConsL.:1blc Brown 
attempled Lo do so Kudling became! o.ggressive crnd would 
not pcrmil ltim to search his pockcls. 
held Rud lin g and began Lo searcl1 him. 
BoLh conslables Lhen 
l{ud l ing c.llnied down 
and said "You can search me~". l\o Ll1 cous Lab les re kased 
their hold of him o.nd Conslable Glazebrook turned lo walk 
mvay leaving the search lo be continued by Constable Brown. 
Rudling bcc:1mc vio]c11t :1g;1i11 . lie hit ConsL;1hlc' C:L1,.ehrook 
and Llw11 Lril.!d Lo ligliL buLli cunsLalilL!s. They subdued him 
Rudling ,-1..-is charged with assaulting Corn,t,1blc GlazC'brook in 
the execution of his duty, contr..-iry tu section 77 (a) of 
the Police Offences Act 1927. JI(' 1v,1s convicted ol Ll1is offence 
in the Magistrates Court. 
Rud ling appea l ed against this conviclion lo Lhe Supreme Court. 
It wo.s submitted for the appL',11 LmL tlwt al thL: time 
Conslable Glazebrook was assa11lLL'd he 1vas not .1cting in Lbc 
execution ot his duly for the reason that the police do not 
have an automatic or standard rigl1L ot search of an arrested 
Lhe purpose of protecting his valuables. 
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After reviewing the existing authority Holland J held: 11 
"There is undoubtedly a right to search a person 
upon hL:; :1rrl'sl p1-ovidl'<l Lill' circumsl;111e.:es warr;111L 
it , but there is nothing I can find in the cases 
which support till' propt>i,itio11 lh:it tl1t•t·<' i11 .1 
general right to search every arresLed person. 
A fortiori there can be no right to search an 
arrested person ngninsl his will merely for the 
purpose of taking from him against his will his 
valuables." 
The learned judge found as a fact that the police were 
searching Rudling for the purpose of taking possession of his 
valuables. For tha~ reason he was bound to hold that such a 
search was unauthorised and illegal. Therefore Ruclling could 
not be convicted of assaulting Constable Glazebrook in the 
execution of his duty. The appeal was accordingly ailowed. 
However, Holland J exercised a power provided by section 13212 
of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 and ammended the conviction 
for assaulting a constable in the execution of his duty to one 
of common assault. On the ammended charge Rudling \vas given 
the same sentence as that imposed by the learned Magistrate 
for his original conviction in the Magistrates Court. 
The case of Rudling v. Police is a direct authority for the 
proposition that the common law power does not extend to 
confer a right on police officers to search arrested persons 
for the purpose of taking possession of their valuables. The 
respondents argued before Holland J that Constable Glazebrook 
by attempting to search Rudling was acting in accordance with 
the established police procedure of removing all valuables 
from arrested persons before they are placed in the cells. 
Under cross-examination Constable Brown referred to this 
13 
procedure o.s "Standard Police practice for their protection, 
expecially when they are down in the cells - other people take 
I . . . 
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(8) 
their properly." The effec L of Llw decision in Rudling 
v . Poli~ is to deny lawfu l justification Lo Lhis es t ab lish ed 
police procedure . 
Holland J went on in the case to propose a test of Lhe 
c I t·l' ll\\\ Hl ,\1\Vl':i I 11 \vl1 I l·lt .1 r ! 1·,li t I 11 1:1·.1 rl·l1 .1 Ill' 111<>11 11po11 1t I:; 
d 'd . 14 arrest i ex ist: 
"th e test must be whether the person arrested 
g ives r eason to suspect that he might have on him 
e ith er C'V i<l cnce rl'lntin1•, lo thC' crim(! in respect 
of wh i ch he had been arrested or oLher crimes or 
something which could cause injury to himself or 
othe r persons or property of others whi l e he was 
under arrest The test must be an objective 
one as to whether it was reasonable to conduct 
the search . " 
Rudling v . Police cont a in s then a statement of the limits 
of the common law power. The statement is obiter dictum. 
This statement of the common law power can be taken Lo confer 
le ga l justification fo r police searches in three situations; 
where an a rres ted person gives reason to suspecL that he 
might have on him a mea ns of injuring l1imsell or oLhers or 
th e prope rty of others while in custody (hereinafter referred 
to as a "power to search for a means of committing injury"), 
where an arrested man g i ves reasoo Lo suspect thaL he might 
have on him evidence of the offence with ~1ich he is charged 
(hereinafter referred to as a "power to search for evidence 
of the offence charged"), and where an arrested person gives 
r eas on to suspect that he might have on him evidence of any 
offence (hereinafter referred to .:1s a "power of search for 
any evidence") . 
I . .. 
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We will now examine the extent to which corrunon law authority 
supports the formulation of the limits of the common law power 
as stated by Holland J. 
In Rudling v. Police Lhe learned judge turned to five learned 
aulhon1 for :tid in .111);\,l'ri11r. ll1t· <Jlll':il 1011 .1:; le> wl1.il .11-c• till' 
l'.J 
limits of the common law power. The conclusion that the 
learned judge arrived at was Lhat the weight of authority in 
the textbooks and refcrl'ncc work Ln which he referred W.'.1S 
against a general right of search but that the law was unclear 
I . . 16 as to t11s point. 
Four of the works referred to by Holland J support the 
proposition that there is no general common law power to search 
an arrested person. 1? These works support Lhe proposition 
that there is a power to search arrested persons but that il is 
a power limited to parlicular situations. Only one textbook 
lends support to the proposition that there is a general power 
18 
to search arrested persons. It is submilled that the weight 
of authority in these works is clearly against n general power 
of search. The reference work and textbooks arc clear that no 
automatic power to search every arresled person exists but that 
the power of search only arises in p:HLicular siluations. The 
common law power is therefore a limited power. It is the 
extent of that limited power of search which is unclear. 
Three of the works support the proposition that there is a 
power to search for a means of committing injury. They describe 
this power in differing terms however. Halsbury states that 
an arrested person may be searched where Lhere are reasonable 
groun~for believing that he has on his person any weapon 
with which he might do himself or othernan injury or any 
implement with which he might effect escape.
19 
Leigh describes 
it as a power to search an arrested person for nny weapon or 
!111pll'llll'itl 1vhil·lt 1ni1•,ltl t'11:1J,ll· !II(' p1·i::c111c·1· LP ('c1111111lt :111 :tcl of 
I ... 
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20 
violence or effect his escape . Adams provides the most 
general description of this power in stating that there is 
a power to search an arrested person to ensure that he has 
no offensive weapon or other means of injuring himself or 
21 
others while in custody. Thus while these works provide 
support (or Lhc proposi Li on Lhal t lic•n· is a power Lo st•,1rch 
for a means of committing injury Ll1ey arc unclear as to the 
precise limits of that power . 
Adams states that there is also a power to search an arrested 
f 'bl . I 
22 
person or possi e evicence. Phipst:ln states that on the 
arrest of a prisoner for any crime the police may seize 
and retain all material evidence in his possession for 
d 
. . 23 
pro uction in court . Leigh states that there is a power to 
search an arrested p~rson for any articles in his possession 
which the police officer believes Lo be connected with Lhe 
offence charged, or which may be used in evidence against him, 
or which may give a clue to the commission of the crime, or 
l . d . f. . £ I . . 1 
24 I . 1 f t1e i enti ication o t 1e crinnna . t is unc e.:ir -rom 
these works however, whether the power is only to search for 
evidence of the offence charged, or to search for any evidence . 
Halsbury states that an arrested person may be searched where 
there are reasonable grounds for bC' 1 icving Lh:1t he has in his 
possession evidence \vhich is material Lo the offence wilh \vhich 
25 
he is charged. On the other hand Kenny statQS that any 
property may be taken which is found in the possession of the 
arrested person and which would form material evidence on the 
26 
~rosecution of any criminal charge against any person. Archbold, 
which was not referred to by Holland J, adopts an intermediate 
position taking it to be settled law that Lhe police may take 
any goods found in the possession or house of an arrested person 
which they reasonably believe to be material evidence in relation 
to the crime which he was arrested . If in the course of the search 
the police come on any other goods which show the arrested 
per-son Lo be i111plicaLL:d in ~.01nl' olltl·t· crime Liley llld)' take them 
provided they act reasonably and detain them no longer than 
27 
necessary . 
I ... 
( 11) 
To determine precisely what the limits of the common law 
powe r a r e , it is necessary to review the cases which have 
g i ven r i se to the power . 
The leading New Zealand case in relation to the limits of 
28 
Lil e co1rnnu11 Lt1v [JO\vl' 1· i 8 l\,1 r11v l l .u1d (: 1·anl v. C:unpi>t: 11. 111 
t hat case Campbell, a police constable, entered and searched 
the premises of Grant . lle was acting under the authority 
of a warrant a l leging that those premises were kept and 
used as a gaming house . The warrant authorised Campbell to 
cnLor CrnnL ' s prl'rnisl's ,u1d Sl'a1·ch .1nd Sl'iZl' :Ill inslrumvnts 
of unlawful gaming which might be found therein, and to 
arrest, search, and bring before a Justic of the Peace, 
Grant, among others, as a-keeper of the premises. Campbell 
found Grant on the premises and also found books and papers, 
being the property of Grant and Barnett, which constituted 
evidence of unlawful gaming . Campbell left taking nothing 
with him, but returned twenty minutes later and took away the 
books and papers . He did not arrest Grant. Grant was in 
fact never arrested. He was proceeded against sometime 
afterward in respect of another charge, not being that contained 
in the information on which the warrant was issued. The books 
and papers were in the meantime detained by Campbell. 
The New Zealand Court ofAppeal in a judgement delivered by 
Cooper J held, inter alia, that the seizure of the books and 
papers was not justified as being pursuant to the common law 
29 
power ; 
"This power to seize .. . upon arrest, is involved 
in and is a part of the power to search the alleged 
offender, and it is clear Lhat bcrore Lhe right to 
search the person of the offender arises the arrest 
must be effec t ed . The right to a personal search is 
clL·:tl'ly dl'j)L'11tk11l 1wl tlJHl11 li1l' ri1•,l1l lo ;1rn•1:L, hut 
the fact of arrest, and Lhat at the time of search 
II 
the p erson is in cuslodia legis. 
I ... 
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The effect of this decision is to limit the situations in 
which the common law power can be exercised to those situations 
in which a police officer has actually arrested a person. 
JO 
In the recent case of Mcfarlane v. Sharp the Court of Appeal 
exprL'ssJy L :ll upcn Lhl' poi;sii>i lily Lli;tl LliL: nil11;tl Lonu ln 
which the common law power can be exercised may be extended 
31 
however. The facts of that case were thal the police suspected 
Mcfarlane of being involved in a bank robbery. They entered his 
house pursuant to a valid search warrant. The search revealed no 
evidence relating to the rohbC'ry but the police did djscover 
and seize documents which constituted evidence of bookmaking 
which were not covered by the warrant . Mcfarlane consented 
to accompany the police officers to the police station where he 
was questioned by the·m. Two hours later he was arrested on a 
charge of bookmaking. 
It was not argued before the Court of Appeal that Mcfirlane v. 
Sharp was distinguishable on the facts from the earlier case 
of Barnett and Grant v. Campbell. Therefore the court was 
bound to treat the case before it as one in which the 
documents relating to bookmaking were seized unlawfully. 
However, the Court of Appeal left open the point as to whether 
a police officer \.Jlto lawfully came across cviclcnce of .rn 
offence could sieze that evidence and then arrest the person in 
possession of the evidence, treating the arrest and the seizure 
as one continuous transaction . The search an<l seizure could 
then be justified as notionally contemporaneous with the arrest 
and therefore "incidental Lo the arrest" pursuant Lo the common 
law power. If it were to be decicled that the seizure of 
evidence in such circumstances was justified it would not 
abrogate the rule in Barnett and Grant v. Campbell that the 
power of search is dependant not on the right to arrest but 
upon the fact of arrest. The effect of such a decision would 
be to ex lend Llw conct·pl of wht•n :1 Sl',Hch and s1>i zurc is 
" incidental to arrest" . 
I ... 
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The l eading cases in support of the formulation of the limits 
of the common law power as stated by llolland Jin Rudling v. 
32 Police are the civil cases of Leigh v . Cole and Bessell 
· 1 33 v . W1. son . 
that there is a power Lo search for a means of conunitting 
injury . In the case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, 
a Superintendent of Police, did, inter alin, unlawfully search 
the plaintiffs clothes . The plaintiff had been arrested for 
being drunk nnd taken lo the sl:1Lion house where, at Lhe 
direction of Lhe deicndanl, Lhc plainlill was searched and certain 
articles taken from him. In his summing up of the case to the 
jury Williams J stated in relation to the search of a prisoner 
34 
that: 
"Even when .:1 m.:1n is confined for being drunk and 
disorderly, it is not correct to s.:1y th.:1t he must 
submit to the degr.:1dation of being searched, as 
the searching of such a person must depend on all 
the circumstances of the case." 
The learned judge thus states that the common law power is 
nol a general power which may be exercised in the case of all 
arrested persons, but th.:1t it is a limited pow~r. 
What then are the limits of the power to search for a means 
f ? 11 d l 
35 o - conunitting injury. Wi iams J state trnt: 
"a man when in custody may so conduct himself by 
reason of violence of language or conduct, that a 
police officer may think it prudent and right to 
search him, in order to ascertain whether he has 
any weapon with which he might do mischief to the 
person or co111111il a hrL·:1cli of Llll' pl',1Cl'. 11 
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Essentially the learned judge is proposing a reasonableness 
test of the limits of the power to search for a mean of 
committing injury, the test being whether a police officer, 
t:1king inLo :1ccounL at! Liiv cire111111-;L:1nct's of Lile c:1se, cuulcl 
reasonably believe, from the violence of language or conduct 
ul ;111 .1!"1"1':;11•tl 111;111, It ltl ill' p111tl1·11I . 111(! 1· i1•,l1i lo 11t·,1r<'l1 
the man in order to find ouL whcLher he has any weapon with 
which he might either; injure himself, or another person, 
or commit a breach of the peace. A breach of tlie peace is 36 
"apparently any crime or offence whatever" . Any other offences 
which ;111 .1rrL'Sl°l'd m:m co11ld lw n·.1:;011.1hly vxpL'Cll'd Lo c.:oin111iL 
with a weapon apart from injury to the person would appear to 
be limited to an attempt to escape or damaging the property 
of others . If the police officer could reasonably have 
believed it prudent and right to search the arrested man in 
these circumstances then the search is justified; if he could 
no½ then it is illegal. 
In Bessell v . Wilson Lord Campbell provides an illustration 
of the limits of the power to search for n means of committing 
injury. In the case before Lhe learned judge a man was 
apprehended pursuant to a warrant not charging him with any 
crime, but merely to make him ,lppear in pe:rson before nn 
J7 alderman . The man was searched. LorJ Campbell slated: 
"It is said that the search here was justified, 
because the person in custody might have some 
instrument about him \vith which he might make 
away with or injure himself, or the alderman 
before whom he was brought. This docs not appear 
a satisfactory reason; it assumes that when a man 
is apprehended, because he has in Lhc first instance 
appeared by counsel, and not in person, he will take 
with him the means of committing suicide or murder. 
This i:; :1 ntu:;l .il,:;11rd ::11111H,::i1 iL111. 11 
I ... 
-0 
0 
-· 
-v 
0 
'f, 
" -• 
(15) 
It may be argued that Lhis siluation is distinguishable from 
the situation in which a maJ1 was in custody because he was 
charged with a felony, and that in that case a search might 
be justified solely on the grounds that the man may have taken 
into cuslody with him Ll1e means of committing suicide or 
murdc r . TL is s11hrnilll'd limvL'Vl't-, 1h:1l this .1q•,11111<'11L r;hould 
not be accepted as a statemenl of the common law . The principle 
which led Lord Campbell to decide that a search was not 
justified in the case before him was that the fact a man was 
taken into custody was not a satisfactory reason for searching 
that man in order to ensure lhc1t he did not have wilh him the 
means of injuring himself or others. It is s.1bmitted that 
by the use of this illustration Lord Campbell is suggesting 
that something more than the mere fact of custody is required 
to justify such a search, be it custody as Lhe result of a 
warrant to make the man appear in person before an alderman 
as in the case before his lordship, or cuslody on the result 
of having been charged with a felony. Thus the poliie would 
not for example be justified in searching a man charged with 
the felony of theft solely for Lhe reason thal lte may have 
taken into custody with him Lhe means of conm1ilting suicide 
or murder . 
This inLcrprclation ol L!tc illuslralion given by Lord Cumpbcll 
in Hessell v. Wilson of the limils of the powec to search for 
the means to commit injury is consistent wilh the statement of 
Williams J in Leigh v . Cole Lo Lhe effect that a police 
officer who undertakes a search under this power must have 
reason to suspect, arising out of the violence of language or 
conduct of an arrested man and taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case, that the arrested man may have a 
weapon with which he might either injure himself, or others, 
or attempt to escape, or damage the property of others . 
l.ogic:1lly LilL' pmvcr Lo .;l',trc\1 !'01- tilL' 111v:111s to CL>n11niL injury 
could be exercised at any time in the period of the arrested 
mans custody . The power does not arise from the offence for 
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which the man is arrested but from the violence of his language 
or conduct while in custody. It is that violence of language 
or conduct which may give a police officer reason to suspect 
that the man has a weapon. Such violence may not m.-inifcst 
itself at the time of arrest but only at a later period of 
LlH' /\rrL'S{ L'd 111;111~; CllS{ ody. 
Bessellv . Wilson is the leading case in support of the 
proposition that there is a power to searcl1 ior evidence of 
the offence charged. The case involved a civil claim in which 
the plaintiff brought on ;ict ion [or f;il SC' imprisonment against 
an alderman who issued a warrant for his apprehension requiring 
the plaintiff to be brought in custody before a Justice of the 
Peace. Under the warrant the plaintiff was apprehended and 
imprisoned in a polite station. In compliance with the general 
rule acted upon at the police station the plaintiff was 
searched. 
In an addendum to the report of the case it is stated that at 
the close of the argument the Chief Justice, Lord Campbell, 
made some observations in reference to the practice of 
searching prisoners, Lord Campbell said that it ,vas not his 
opinion with respect to the searching of persons ~10 arc 
charged with offences Ll1al there was no right in anyone Lo 
h 
. . 38 searc a prisoner at anytime: 
"It is often the duty of an officer to search a 
prisoner. If, for instance, a man is taken in the 
commission of a felony, he may be searched to sec 
whether the stolen articles arc in his possession; 
or whether he has any instruments of violence about 
him; and in like manner if be be taken on a charge 
of arson, he may be searched Lo see whether he has 
any fireboxes or matches about his person. It 
m;1y be highly s;1t if;J°:ictory .111cl indvl'd t1t ! Cl'Ss;1ry trlwt 
the prisoner should be searched." 
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As it has been seen Lord Campbell did not think that the 
search in the case before him was justified. 
It could be argued t:lwt the le;irned judge in P,essell v. Wilson 
is citing examples of a general power to search any person 
charged with a felony could be searched for evidence of the 
commission of any felony. Similarly any person charged with 
the commission of a particular offence of arson could be 
searched for evidence of the co~1ission of any offence of arson. 
It is submitted thal Lord Campbell is proposjn~· no such general 
power however. The examples of the circumstances in which a 
search would be "satisfactory and indeed necessary" which 
Lord Campbell cites relate to specific offences where evidence 
exists as to the commission of those offences. The evidence 
that the police are justified in searching for is only evidence 
in relation to the specific offence £or which the arrested 
person is taken into custody. Thus a police search of an 
arrested person would be justified if the person was arrested 
for stealing bread, and the search was for stolen bread; or if 
the person was arrested for assault with a weapon, and the 
search was for the weapon; or if the person was arrested for 
arson, and the search was for the means to commit the arson. 
The power of searclt Ll1;1 L is dcscr ibcd by Lord Campbe 11 then 
only applies to evidence of the commission oft-he specific offence 
for which the person being searched has been arn!s Led. 
It could also be argued that Lhc statement of Lord Campbell 
that
3911
It is often the duty of an officer to search a prisoner. 
If for instance, a man is taken in the commission of a felony, 
he may be searched to see whether he has any instruments 
of violence about him." lends support to the proposition that 
there is a power to search for a means of committing injury. 
Prima facie this statement can be taken as an authority for the 
proposiLLon Lhal Lhis power o[ sc,trcli is a gener.il power Lo search 
I ... 
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a person, upon arrest for any felony, in order to ascertain 
whether he has any instruments o[ violence about him. It 
has been argued above that this statement of Lord Campbell's 
aµpcars jn L11e conLexL o[ a discussion o[ Lhe power Lo search 
for evidence of the offence charged. The example of a search 
for insln1111vnls 01· violt·,wl· cill·d hy l.ord C:.1111phl·II n·lilll'tl 
then to a search for evidence of llic commission of a specific 
felony. It does not relate to Lhe power Lo search for a means 
of committing injury, as the le,trned judge was not directing his 
mind to that point. It is therefore submitted that Bes sell v. 
Wilson is not ,rn .1uthority for Lill' propositinn thaL the power 
to search for a means of committing injury is a general power 
to search a person, upon arrest for any felony in order to 
ascertain whether he has any instruments of violence about him. 
Before a police officer could exercise the power to search for 
evidence of the offence charged, he would have to show a 
reasonable ground for suspecting Lhat the arrested person had 
possession of evidence of the offence for ~1ich he had been 
arrested. In the examples cited by Lord Campbell in Hessell 
v . Wilson the arrested persons have all been 'taken" in the 
commission of an offence. The fact that they are caught in the 
commission of :rn offvnct' might )',iv,, tl1l' ;11·rv:,l ing officc•r. llll' 
reasonable ground to suspect LhaL Lile arrested person had 
evidence in his possession which he needs to show in order to 
justify a search for that evidence. However, in situations in 
which a man is arrested on suspicion of having comrniLLed an 
offence, but has not been caught in the commission of that offence, 
the arresting officer has to show a reasonable ground for 
suspecting that the arrested person has in his possession 
evidence of the offence, which is over and above that of a 
reasonable belief in the actual conunission of the offence. In 
such situatiorE it would be incumbent upon the arresting officer 
to show that some additional factor, for example information from 
a reliable infonnanL L:o Llic cffrcL LliaL Lhc 111.tn had slolen goods 
in his possession, afforded him reasonable grounds for suspecting 
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that the man had in his possession evidence of Lhe offence 
for which he was arrested al Lhc time of his arrest. 
It has been argued that Hessell v. Wilson only supports the 
propos ition that the common l~w power includes the power to 
sc~1rch for L'Vi<.kncl' of Lill' ol i"l'11cl' cli;11-gcd . Tl1l' CcLSl' o[ 
40 
Elias v. Pasmore on the other hand supports the proposition 
that the co~non law power includes the power to search for any 
evidence . The facts of that case were as follows. Acting 
under the authority of a warrant for the arrest of Hannington 
alleging :1 clwrgc of scdiLion, policL'. officers c·nL('red Lhe 
premises of Elias. Hannington was on the premises and was 
arrested . The police officers searched llannington and further 
s earched the premises . A letter was found in the possession of 
Hannington which was material evidence that Elias was inciting 
Hannington to commit sedition. A number of other seditious 
documents were found on the premises . They also showed that 
El ias had been inciting Hannington to commit sedition. The 
police proseculed Elias and the documents were used at his 
trial. He was convicted. Elias afterwards said that the police 
officers had no right to Lake his papers and brought an aclion 
for damages fo r trespass against them . 
Before llorri<lgc J it was contended Lhal Ll1e police officers 
were entitled to seize , remove and retain the documents on the 
fo llowing grounds, inter alia: 41 
"l. that there was a right to senrch the person 
arrested; 
2 . that the police may take all articles which 
were in the possession or control of the person 
nrreste<l and which may be or arc rnnterial on a 
charge against him or any other person; 
3. that the police, having lawfully entered, are 
prolcctccl ii Liley L;1ke documents whi eh subse-
quently turn out to be relevant on a charge of 
a criminal nature against any person whatever . " 
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As to the first ground Horridge J held that the right Lo search 
on arrest, through clearly established in Hessell v. Wilson, 
did not authorise what was done in Lhe case before him, namely 
Lhe seizure .:md t.1.king away o[ large quantities o[ documents 
and other property [ound on premises occupied by persons other 
42 Lhan thL~ pl'rsnn 01· \~hrnn !IH' .1rn:st 1v.1s 111,idl'. 
As to the second ground the learned judge held that Lhe case 
of Dillon v . O'Brien clearly established LhaL police officers 
are entitled upon a lawful arrest to take and detain property 
found in the possession of the arrested person which is 
mule r lul cv i<lcncc of LlwL er l111e. '!'lie lca1 ne<l judge furll1er 
held that police officers arc also entitled Lo Lake and detain 
property found in the possession of the o.rrested person which 
. . 1 . d f . 43 is materia evi ence- o any crime. 
As to the third ground the learned judge held that the seizure 
of documents, which seizure would otherwise be unlawful must be 
excused if it appears in fact th;it such documents were evidence 
f . . d b 44 o a crime committe y anyone. 
Horridge J's decisions as to Lhe second und Ll1ird grounds 
contended in support of the proposition that the police officers 
were cnLiLled Lo sciZL: and ret:1i11 Ll1e <locu1HL'11ts arc then, prima 
facie, authority for two distinct powers of seizure. The 
decision as to the second ground excuses Lhe seizure of 
evidence in the possession of an arrested man which is evidence 
of any criminal charge . The decision as to the third ground 
excuses the seizure of evidence ,-1hich would otherwise be 
unlawful, if in fact such evidence were evidence of a crime 
committed by anyone . The learned judge relied on the cases of 
P . 1 B d S . 1 · 
4 S d · 11 1 • 46 ring e v . remner an Lir ing, an Di on v. 0 Brien as 
his principal support in reaching these decisions. 
Pringle v. Bremner and Stir_!_i...!21,;_ \v<\S a Scotch C.'.lS{!. In till' 
course of a search of Lhe premises of the pursuer (appellanl), 
pursuant to a warrant, for pieces of wood used in exploding a 
cart outside the manse of a minister, police officers discovered 
I . . . 
• 
-0 
0 
-· 
-0 
0 
~ 
" -' 
(21) 
evidence implicating the pursuer in the sending of a 
threatening letter to the minisler . It is clear from the 
facts of the case that the issue before the court related 
to Lhe seizure of Lhe pursuers propL·rty and ils possible 
u s e in prosecuting him for an alleged criminal offence. 
Th e isStlL' could nol h:1vl' i>l'<'ll \vhvtl1(·1- Llil' propc•rly which 
seized could be used in the prosecution of anyone else 
because the police in that case did not seize any property 
wh ich could be used in Llw prosccutjon o[ anyone else. It 
is therefore difficult to deduce from Prin~ v . Bremner and 
SUrU1~ LhL' propos i lio11 Lli;1L Llil' polin• c,111 Hl'izl' docu111cnls 
wh i ch are evidence of a crime committed by anyone. It is 
therefore submitted that Lhe case of Pringle v. Bremner and 
Stirli12_g should not be regarded as providing supporl for the 
decision in Elias v. Pasmore that~e seizure of evidence, 
which would otherwise be unlawful, m11st be excuse<l if it appears 
in fact that such documenls were evi<lence to a crime committed 
by anyone . 
Despite this Horridge J took the opinions of T.ord Chelmsford 
47 and Lord Colonsay in that case to show: 
"though tl-c seizure of documents was originally 
\vrongful, it iL in (acl Lurned oul tl1:1l llic 
documents seized were documents ~1ic~ might be 
properly used in a prosecution against anyone, 
then the seizure would become excused." 
As Pringle v . Bremner and Stirling was a Scotch case Horridge J 
went on to consider!l:'lir~h~L~ctrine which he took the case to 
decide could in principle be applied to a seizure of documents 
in England . 
The learned judge thus went on to examine the Irish case of 
Di ll on v . O'Uricn. ln Lhul c;1s' Dillon, an M. [>., /,LS arrestcu 
by O' Brien and Davis acting under the authority of a warrant 
ordering Dillon's arrest for conspiracy . O'Brien and Davis 
took and detained banknotes and other property found on the 
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premises where the arrest was effected for the purpose of 
producing them as evidence in the prosecution of Dillon. 
Di] Ion v. O'Br-icn w;1s decided on the• principh• that: t:hc inLLcrcst: 
of the state in the person charged being brought to trial 
1wccss:1ri.ly cxlcnds ;1s 111.•J I Lu litl' pn·1;crvalion oL 111.·1LerL1l 
evidence of his guilt or innocence as to his custody for the 
purpose of trial .
48 
Horridge J exlended this principle to 
the siLuation in Elias v. Pasmore which involved the seizure 
of evidence of a crime commitled by a man following the arrest 
- I l I I · I I 49 ol ,1not 11.•r 111.111. 'I'll' v:11·!lv< 111, )',t' ::l.1ll'<: 
"the inLcresLs of Ll1e Slate must: excusc L11e seizure 
of documenLs, which would oLherwise be unlaurful, if 
it appe:1rs in fact LhaL such documenls were evidence of 
a crime committed by anyone . " 
It i s submitted that this extension of the princple staled in 
Dillon v . O'B rien to the situation in Elias v. Pasmore was made 
by Horridge Jon a misreading of the way in which Palles C.B. 
had distinguished Entick v . Carrington 50 from Lhe issue 
to be decided in Dillon v. O'Brien . 
In Dillon v . O'Brien Pallcs C.B. had said ol EnLick C . 51 v. arr 1.n&i:_on: 
" in that case there was no allegation of the plaintiffs 
guilt , nor that there was reasonable or probable 
cause for believing him guilty, nor that a crime had, 
in fact , been committed by anyone, nor Lbat he had in 
his possession anylhing LliaL w.'.ls evidence of (or that 
there were reasonable grounds for believing might be 
evidence of) a crime conunitted by him or anyone else." 
Horridge J placed more emphasis on the last three words of this 
sLJ.LernenL Lh;in perh:1ps 11as inlcndl·d. 'l'hl' lcarne<l judge Look 
the statement to mean Lhat if there bad been evidence of a crime 
committed by anyone other than Dillon in the c:1se 01 Dillon v. 
O'Brien then Lhe seizure of Lhat: evidence might have been lawful 
I, .. 
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as being in the jnteresls of Llie slale. Dillon v. O' Brien 
cannoL be Laken Lo suggesl lliis posiLi.on however. Pnllcs C . 13 . 
distinguished Entick v. Carrington from the case before him 
. f h 1 5211 on the issue o· w ether the rue that, at least in cases of 
treason and felony, constables . .. are entitled, upon a lawful 
:1n·t·sl hy tl1t•111 of n11v cl1:11·1·,vcl wilh t1·c·.1:;011 or 11•lony, lo tnl«• 
and detain property found in his possession which will form 
material evidence in his prosecution for tllat crime" should be 
extended to the cases of misdemeanour . From this statement it 
is clear Lhat Palles C.13. was noL considering L11e issue of whether Lhe 
seizure of evidence of a crime commiLLed by anyone other than 
the arrested person would be justified. It is therefore submitted 
that Horridge J was wrong in law in deciding that the seizure of 
ev i dence , which would otherwise be unlawful, must be excused if 
it appears in fact that such documents were evidence of a crime 
committed by anyone. 
In the recent decision of the English Court of Appeal in 
53 
Ghani v. Jones, Lord Denning resLricted the decision in 
Elias v. Pasmore to the seizure of evidence implicaled in the 
offer-ce that Lhe arrested person is charged wiLh. llis Lordship 
stated that the decision in Elias v. Pasmore that the seizure 
of documents would be excused ii it appeared that those 
documenLs were evidence of a crime con1111iLed by an1 one 1-1enL too 
54 
far . Elias v. Pasmore is therefore no longec an authority 
for the power to seize evidence, which would otherwise be 
unlawful, if it is evidence of a crime co~nitted by anyone . 
Elias v . Pasmore remains an authority for the proposition that 
police officers upon a lawful arrest by them, have a power to 
seize evidence of any crime which the arrested man m<lY have 
committed . The principal support for this proposition is found in 
the judgement of Lord Chelmsford in Lhe case of Prii:~ v. Bremner 
and Stirling . The relevant passage is cited by Horridge Jin 
55 . 56 Elias v. P<1smorc . Lord Chl'l1nslord s:1icl: 
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"But supposing that in a search which might 
have been improper originally, there were matters 
discovered which showed the complicity of the 
pursuer in a cri1nc, Llic·11 r Lliink Lile orficcrs, 
I can hardly say would have been justified, but 
\,J l) \I I d Ii, l V L'. h t' l' ll L' X l' l I ! ; l • d I> y l Ji l' 1· C ! ; l ii l O ! 
search." 
l lici r 
The sei7ure of evidence of any crime which the arrested 
man may have committed is then excused in law. It is not 
howCVL'r, .iusLiCicd as being p11r:;u:111l l,l thl' policl' o[ficen; 
power to search. The case of Barnett and Grant v. Campbell 
is an authorily for Lhe proposition that Lhe common law power 
to search for evidence is limited to a power Lo search for 
evidence of the offence with which .:.in arres tcd man is charged. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in that case took it to be 
57 settled law that: 
"a constable who is legally authoried to arrest an 
accused person may, at Lhe time of such arresL, and 
as incidental toil, seize and take possession of 
articles in the possession or under the control of 
Lile accused person as evi dl'ncc l t•nd i ng lo shn1v the 
guilt of such person. This is a power of co~non 
law, and exists as an incident to the arrest ... It 
is founded on the right to search a person upon his 
arrest; and the police are entitled to hold and detain 
property so taken as instruments of proof against the 
accused, subject Lo the right of Lhe proper authority 
to direct such property to be restored to the accused 
if it is found that it is in no ¼~Y connected with 
the charge made against: him." 
An examination of the common law authority which existed prior 
Lo Lhe dccisi.on 1n RuJling v. l'ulice L:;111 Llicn be St:L'll Lo suppot-L 
the formulation of the limits of the co~non law power as stated 
by Holland J to the extent that there is an established power 
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to search an arrested person ~1ere there is a reasonable 
suspicion Lhat he has in his poss('ssion a 111cans of conunitting 
injury and for evidence of the offence charged. The law 
will excuse the seizure by police officers of evidence found 
in the possession of an arrested man during the course of a 
1awftil s1':1rch, \vhich i!; 1•vid<'11c1• u1· .1ny olhl'r oflv11u· lh:1l 
the arrested man may have co~nitted. There is however, no 
persausive common law authority in support of the proposition 
that police officers have a power to search arrested persons 
for evidence of any offence other than that with which he was 
charged. 1t is therefore suhmiL·t:cd lh.1l Ll1C' Lc'sl of whelhcr 
a search by a police officer of an arrested person is 
justified as being pursuant to the common law power is: 
"whether the person arrested gives re.1son to 
suspect that he might have on him either evidence 
relating to the offence in respect of which he 
had been arrested, or something which could cause 
injury to himself or the persons or properly of 
others while he was under arrest." 
Now that the precise limits of Lhe power have been determined 
it is possib1e to consid1•r lh,' h:1l:1nev lh:11 thv crnrnnon Lnv 
power has achieved between the privacy inlercsl and the interest 
in efficient law enforcement. 
The common law limited the justification of a police search of 
an arrested person to two situations; where a search is for a 
means to commit injury, and where a search is for evidence of 
the offence charged. 
In the first situation the prime interest in efficienl law 
enforcement that is being protected by the existence of Lhe 
power of search is the inLeresL of the state in the safety of 
police L1llicers d11d 0Ll1er pL·r.s,in:;, \vlw comL' iulo conLacL wilh L11e 
arrested person. This is an important interest. The power of 
search to protect this interesl is only justified where the 
I ... 
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a rres t ed person gives reason Lo suspect th.:it he might have 
on h i m a means of i n juring other persons . In situations 
wh e r e th e a rre s ted person does give such reason it is clearly 
necessary that a police officer s h oul<l have a power to search 
him i n orde r t o establ i sh wheth er thaL person does prese n t a 
<l a ngcr . Thi s cn nsi(kr,1Lion ov,•1-riclL"i Llw inll'rt'Sl o( Lile 
a rres t ed pe r son i n t h e pr ivacy o[ h is person and possessions 
because i n such circumslanccs the injury to his privacy is 
c l early outweigheJ by the reasonable apprehension of injury 
t o t h e in te r es t of the police and other persons in their 
ph ysic:11 s:ifcty . Si111 i L1r consicll'r:11 ions :1pply wlH'i-t' :in 
a r re st e d perso n gives reason Lo suspecl Lltal he might inflict 
in jury upon himse l f. The reasonable apprehension of such 
in jury would again c l early outweigh Lhe injury to that persons 
,1rivacy i n te r est. The power of search for a means of commit ting 
i n ju r y r epresents then a balance of the interests of individual 
privacy and eff i c i ent l aw enforcement whereby the common law 
power recognised the impo r tance of the interest in prbtecting 
both oth e r persons and the arrested person himself in situations 
whe r e a n a rrested person gives reason to suspect that he may 
pr esent a danger to individual s afety, as overriding individual 
pr ivacy interests . The privacy interest of arrested persons 
r emains safeguarded to a large exlcnt however, by the fact thaL 
t he power of search may only be exercised where clll arrcsled 
pe rs on g i ves a po l ice officer reason to suspect_ that he has on 
him a means of committing injury . This power of search has 
deve lo pe d in acco r dance with the common law principle that the 
police shoul d on l y be ab l e to exercise powers entrusted to them 
in s ituat i ons in which Lhey can show a reason for exercising 
In th i s way a judicial review is built into its t hat power . 
or,e rat i on . If on the other hand the power was an automatic right: 
th e po lice wou l d have an unrcslricled right t:o search every 
a rres t e d per s on for a means of commit:t:in 6 injury . Such a power 
wou ld be ope n to abuses . By limiting the operation of the power 
a nd th e r eby 111:i.king it revicwahlc by ;111 ind<'p!·nd<•nt iudicial officer 
t he potenti a l to abuse this power of search , thereby infringing 
unnecessa r i ll y on the privacy rights of individuals who do not 
h ave means of committing injury, is minimised. 
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In the second situation, where a search :i:s for evidence of 
the offence charges Lhe inlerest that ie being protected by 
the existence of the power of search is the interest of the 
stale in the prcsc:vaLjon of m:1Lerinl cvi<lcnc,! of Lhe arrested 
mans gui lt or innocence for the purpose of his trial . In the 
situation 1,lil'rc a 11u11 11.td l>l'l'll :it·n·:;lcd !or .111 oflc11ct• Liiv 
common law adopted the position that the trial of the accused 
would be an empty form if evidence of the offence with which 
he was charged could not be produced in support of the charge. 
The dictates of expediency required that wl1e.re il was impossible 
reasonably suspected of the commission of an offence for which 
he was subsequently arrested, Lhen if a police of[icer had 
further reason to suspect Lhal at Lhe time of his arrest the 
man had in his possession evidence. of the offence charged, 
the officer should have the power to search for that evidence. 
Without such a power the evidence might be unavilable or 
disposed of. The result would be that many persons guilty 
of an offence would be acquitted merely because the police 
could not obtain sufficient evidence for a successful prosecution. 
Thus, in such situation, the common law recognised the 
interest of the state in ensuring that possible evidence of an 
offence for which a man could be at-n'sted could be searched for 
Lo facilitate his prosecution, as overriding the privacy 
interest of the arrested man. Under section 19-8 of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 the New Zealand Police enjoy much wider 
powers to obtain search warrants than were available to English 
Police officers at the time Lhe common law power developed. The 
justification for the power Lo search for evidence of the offence 
charged remains valid however, as it is often not practicable 
to obtain a search warrant following Lhe arrest of a person as the 
evidence of the offence may be disposed of before a search warrant 
could be obtained . 
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The common law power <lid not.: develop Lo justify police 
searches in the two olher situalionswhere Lhc slale has an 
interest of efficient law enforcement in which a power of 
search of an arrested person could develop. These 
situations are where a search is for evidence of any offence, 
and wlll'[C a sc:irch is Lo 1-cmovt~ v:1lu,llilcs. 
The reason why the common law power did not develop to 
justify a search in the first of Lhese situatiomwas that the 
states interest in this situation is purely Lhat of increased 
C'fficicncy. Tf tlw comrnnn l:t1v l)()\v('i' li,1<1 h('vn ckvvloped 1;0 
that an arrested person who gave reason to suspect that he had 
possession of evidence of ot.:hcr offences Lhan Llwl' for which 
he had originally been charged could be searched for evidence 
of those other offences, then it would be open Lo the police 
to search for evidence of offences to which they did not have 
a reasonable ground for arrest. In this situation the common law 
would be justifying searches in which the subject of ' the search 
has no warning of the extent to which his pr i.vacy interest is 
to be invaded . Society however, has an important interest in 
being seen to protect Ll1e privacy or its individual citizens 
from unreasonable intrusions by Lhe st.:ite. Tlie common law 
power thus did not develop to justify searches of an arrested 
person lor any olfcuces oLlicr Llwn Lhat.: wilh whid. Llic arrested 
person was charged. The common law does however, excuse the 
service of evidence found in the possession of an arrested person 
which is evidence of an offence other than thaL charged. 
The second situation in which the common law power <lid not 
develop to justify police searches is where a police officer 
searches an arrested person in order Lo remove his valuables. 
Despite the fact that the co111mo1t law power docs not justify 
searches in this situation the police have an established 
procedure for such searches. Police information manuals list 
the removal and care of a prisoners properly as one of the 
reasons for police searches of an arrested person. Police 
General Instruction P. 98 sets out clearly the rules governing 
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the searching of prisoners which musL be followed by all 
police officers. ParL of Lhe general instrucLion is Lo the 
effect that an arresting officer shall inform the watch-house 
keeper of the charge and ~1ere there is no prospecL of the 
prisoner being bailed, search the prisoner thoroughly. The 
arresLing ollLcc1· :.;li,t!L Llie11 l'11::u1 ·l' Ll1.1L .di p1·upl·rLy, includln~ 
money, taken from the prisoner is entered on the property 
sheeLs, form Police 48, verifying Lhc correctness of the property 
sheets and signing them . The justification put forward for this 
police searching procedure is that if it is not carried out 
during the time that he is in custody. The police would then 
find it difficult to disprove allegations of misconduct. 
There is no legal basis for this police procedure al common law. 
The reason for this is tl1at Lhe inLerest of Lhe arrcsLed person 
in the privacy of his own property, which does not present a 
danger to himself or others and which is not evidence of 
the offence with which he was charged, is such that to deny 
him the freedom of choice as to what to do wil:h this property 
would constitute an unw<.trranted inLrusion of Lhe power of the 
state on the rights of the arresLed person. Society as a whole 
is commitLed to mainLaining ;i pcrson,tl freedom or choice in 
areas where the interests of Lhe state do not demand that 
officers of the state should have a power to compel a citizen 
to relinquish his freedom of choice us to Lhc action he will 
take . In most cases an arresLed person would be willing to hand 
over his valuables to a police officer when asked to do so. In 
some cases however, an arresLcd person will refuse Lo do so. 
The reason for this refusal may be that he does not trust Lhe 
police officer or it may be Ll1aL lie does not wish lo co-operale 
with the police . It is submiLted Lhal such circumstances do 
not necessitate a power of search. If a procedure were adopted 
at police stations whereby secure individual lockers were 
provided in which prisoners could Jepo:.;iL Lheir valua!Jles, Lo 
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which only Lhe arres tc<l person lta<l a right of access, Lhen 
a prisoner who <lid nol wislt Lo ltand over bis valuables Lo 
the police for safekeeping would have the choice of placing 
them in a l ocker or retaining Lhcrn on his person . 
A priso1wr \vho chose lo rC'l. ti n hi:; v:1lu:ihlv~: could be !Jarred 
from an a cti on for damages in respect of any loss or damage 
to his properly while he was in custody . The interest of 
the police in protecting themselves from allegalions of 
misconducl would thereby be prolecled. The inLcrcsl of the 
prisoner in rnai.nlninini·. :1 frt'<'dnm or clrnicv :is to wh:ll: lo do 
with his property would also be protected. 
An examination of the limits of the common law power thus 
reveals that the pow~r involes a careful and finely judged 
balancing of the interests involved in the privacy of the 
individual and of efficient law enforcement . As it is a 
common law power however, the precise limits of the power 
are subject to conflicting judicial interpretation and are 
therefore uncertain. The uncertainty of the limits of the 
common law search power works to Lhe advantage of Lhe police. 
The uncertainty of the limits has the effect that the issue 
of whelher a particular police search was authoris ed as being 
pursuant to the common law power is unlikely to- arise frequently 
in the courts . An arrested person who is prosecuted as a result 
of evidence which came to light in an unlawful search is 
unlikely to challenge the lawfulness of that search because 
the lack of c l arity as to the precise limits of the common law 
power makes it difficull to predict the outcome of any possible 
court proceed i.ngs. Similarly an arrested pc rson who is the 
victim of an unlawful searcl1, but who is not prosecuted on the 
basis of any evidence which is found in LhaL search, is unlikely 
to consider the possibility that he might have grounds for 
commencing nn action .:ig:tinsl Lile police .dlq;ing an t1na11l.horised 
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s ea r ch took place. Perhaps the main reason however, as to 
\vh y Lhe limils of the common l:1w power arc so rnre ly 
challenged in the courts is that an arrested person is at a 
great disadvantage in relation Lo the police during the period 
of his custody . He is in an alien environment and is 
(' 0 n f r () n l l' d ; l l (. V l' r V I 11 1· 11 \v i I Ii I I I< ' : ; y I II Ii() I ~ l () r I I I '. 'l 11 I 1 l() r l.l y () j 
the state. Without ready ::iccess to a lawyer he is not in a 
position to know what the limits of the common power are . 
It is therefore not surprising that the arrested person usually 
passively consen~ to police searches of his person and 
possessions 1.hich ;1n' outsidt' llil' p11rvil'w of the l.1w, .1nd 
accepls that the police have a general right to search him . 
The oper~tion of the rule as to the administability of 
evidence a l so works ·to the advant::ige of the police . The rule 
relating to the admissibility of evidence staled in Karuma v . 
SS 50 
The Queen was adopted by Hild C . J. in Mathewson v. Police . 
The learned judge said in that case that the tesl as.to the 
admissibility of evidence is whether the evidence is relevant 
to the m::itters in issue, Lhe court: not being concerned with 
how it \v::ts obtained . This rule is subject: Lo Lhe discretion 
of the presiding judge Lo disallow evidence if the strict 
rules of ::idmis~ih:ililv opcr.1tt' unfairly agilinst lhl' ,1ccused. 
The discretion is in practice usually only exercised where 
evidence is obtained by a trick however, as in.the entrapment: 
cases~O The effect of this rule as to the admissibility of 
ev idence is that a court will admit evidence found in a 
search, not jus t ified by the common law powes as evidence 
in the prosecution of any offence . 
The combined effect of the uncert.:1inty of the limits of the 
common law rule, and the operation of the rule as to the 
admissibility of evidence is that the balance of the interests 
of privacy and of law enforcement wl1ich the common law 
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represents is thrown heavily in favour of efficient law 
enforcement to an extent which abrogates the individuals 
privacy rights in an unnecessary and legally unjustified 
manner. It is therefore respectfully submitted that to 
counteract this imbalance, and to give full effect to that 
b..-1 l~rn 'l' wll i eh the cnin1non 1 :1\v li.1 s dt·v<' 1 opvd lw l 1..;<·t·n :1n 
individual and society as a whol~interest in privacy, and the 
states interest in law enforcement, the common law power should 
be codified in a statutory provision. It is submitted that 
the form of that statutory provision might be: 
"A police officer is justified in searching an arrested 
person if an arrestt'cl per s on gives reason Lo suspect 
that he might have on him either evidence relating 
to the offence in respect of which he had been 
arrested, or something which could cause injury to 
himself or the person or property of others while 
he was under arrest. If in the course of ~uch a 
search a police officer comes upon evidence of an 
offence other Lhan LhaL with which the .'.lrrested person 
is charged then Lhe seizure of th.:i.t evidence is excused." 
The central concern of this article has been the determination of 
the limi Ls of Lhe common Ll\v power anJ Lhe baL:.incc be twcen the 
privacy interest and the law enforcement inter~st that it 
represents . Although space does not permit a discussion of 
the point, it is submitted thaL the codification of the common 
law power would present the legislaLL,re with an opportunity to 
consider in detail the issue of 1,:hat are the appropriate 
penalties for an unlawful search of an arrested person incidental 
to arrest which would mosl cffc c LiVL'l y mainLain that balance 
between the interests of privacy and of law enforcement which 
the common law represents. 
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